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THE EFFECT OF THE YIELD CURVE ON A BOND’S CALL PREMIUM

Wesley M. Jones, Jr, The Citadel
George Lowry, Randolph-Macon College
Mark Bebensee, The Citadel

ABSTRACT
Much of today’s corporate debt is callable, and the value of the call provision attached to
a corporate debt instrument is a function of the likelihood of the call provision’s being exercised
by the bond issuer. This study examines the effect of the shape of the yield curve on the value of
the call premium placed on callable bonds over similar non-callable bonds. Since a bond issuer
will only call a bond when interest rates are lower than they were at the time of the bond’s issue;
the likelihood of a call being exercised will increase as interest rates are expected to decline
over time. The market conveys its expectations about the future direction of interest rates by the
way it prices fixed-income securities. This expectation is reflected in the shape of the yield curve
on government debt. If the yield curve is upward sloping, then the market is conveying its
expectation that, over time, interest rates will rise. This would represent a set of expectations
that reduces the likelihood that a call would be exercised, reduces the value of the call premium,
and drives the price of the callable issue closer to the price of similar non-callable issues.
Conversely, if the yield curve is downward sloping, then the market is conveying its expectation
that, over time, interest rates will decline. This would represent a set of expectations that
increases the likelihood that a call would be exercised, increases the value of the call premium,
and drives the price of the callable issue below the price of similar non-callable issues.
INTRODUCTION
Corporate bond yields are a function of several factors generally assumed to be additive
in nature. First, bonds yields compensate investors for deferring consumption today in favor of
increased consumption at some later time. Investors will not defer consumption today in return
for the same consumption at a later time. It is only the expectation of greater future consumption
that will prompt individuals to defer consumption to a future time. Additionally, compensating
investors for deferred consumption alone is insufficient for prompting investment. Purchasing
power must also be preserved.
For example, if investors require a 3% return to defer
consumption for a year, and if prices rise by 3% during the year, then a 3% rate of return on the
investment (which would cover the reward for deferral of consumption) results in zero gain to
investors; so they would have essentially deferred consumption for free. Investors have no way
of knowing what future inflation rates will be that the time they invest; therefore, the extra return
required to compensate for inflation is based on their expectation of the average level of inflation
over the corresponding holding period. This inflation premium is common to all securities.
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Bond contracts often contain various codicils designed to benefit one party or the other to
the agreement. Most indenture provisions are designed to make the bond more attractive to the
bondholder and thus enhance the price and lower the yield. For example, the imposition of
restrictions on the firm such as a non-subordination provision will cause the market to perceive
the bond as less risky, more attractive, and thus more valuable. This results in downward
pressure on the interest rate that the issuer will be required to agree to over the life of the bond.
[Jones (1998)]
Another contract element one might find in a bond contract is the conversion right. The
conversion right gives the bondholder the option to convert the bond into a specified number of
shares of the company’s stock. This has the theoretical effect of a call option to the bondholder
on the company’s stock and allows the bondholder to participate in share price appreciation
resulting from the company’s investments, if they so desire. For example: A bond is sold in the
primary market for its face value of $1,000; at the time the bond is issued, the issuing company’s
stock is trading for a price of $40 per share. The bond contains a conversion privilege that
allows the bond holder to convert the bond to 20 shares of stock (the conversion ratio). Since
this conversion ratio remains constant, the bondholder now has a call option on the company’s
stock at a strike price of $50 per share ($1,000/20 = $50), and the option is currently out of the
money (strike price > market price).
Most convertible bonds are issued with the conversion option “out of the money” for
obvious reasons. If the bond were issued with the conversion option “in the money,” then
investors would buy the bond and convert it to stock and make a riskless profit. This would
drive the price of the bond up until the conversion call option is approximately “at the money.”
However, if the market believes that price appreciation in the company’s stock is likely to occur,
then the value of the conversion option will increase the value of the bond. This will lower the
yield that the market requires on the convertible bond. (Jones 2001)
The call provision, which allows the issuer to redeem the bond early in the event of a
lower interest environment, has been associated with lower bond prices and higher yields. [See
for example: Allen, Lamy and Thompson (1990), and Jones (2001)]. The current study
examines the continuing effect of these contract elements on yield premiums. Since the value of
the call option on the bond accrues to the borrower (issuer), it is exacted from the lender
(bondholder). If the value of the option increases, then the value of the callable bond declines in
similar fashion. For example, if we compare two bonds that are identical in every aspect except
that one is callable and one is not, then the difference in their market values must be attributable
to the call option. However, the value of the call option actually has two components: the dollar
value of the option (intrinsic value), and the likelihood that the option will be exercised (time
value). As noted earlier, the call option is only valuable to the issuer when interest rates are
lower than they are currently paying. Therefore, the expected value of the call option will
increase as current interest rates differ on the low side from the interest rate on the bond. This is
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why finance professors often note to students that bonds that are trading at a discount to face
value (i.e., market rates are above the coupon rate) are not likely to be called. In this instance,
the value of the call option is essentially zero, because the likelihood of the option’s being
exercised is essentially zero.
If the market expects interest rates over time to decline (as indicated by a downwardsloping yield curve), then the likelihood of a future call increases, and the price of the callable
bond should fall below that of the otherwise identical non-callable bond.
THE MODEL
To examine the effect of the shape of the yield curve on bond yield, the following model
is specified:
YLD      i CVi  Slope

where YLD is the yield on the issue reported on the issue date. The CVi’s represent a vector of
control variables included as the result of theory and prior empirical work. These control
variables include call protection, term to maturity, issue size, issue rating, presence of a
conversion option, and whether the issue is dually-rated or split-rated. For example, see Allen,
Lamy, and Thompson (1990); Altinkilic and Hansen (2000); Billingsley, Lamy, Marr, and
Thompson (1985); Blackwell, Marr, and Spivey (1990); Chatfield and Moyer (1986); Ederington
(1986); Jewell and Livingston (1998); Liu and Moore (1987); Livingston, et al. (1995); Logue
and Rogalski (1979); Sorensen (1979); Rogowski and Sorensen (1985); and Livingston and
Miller (2000).
The slope variable is the slope of the characteristic line through the yield curve on the
day the bond was issued. This variable is used as a proxy for the likelihood of a bond call being
exercised by the issuer. We assume that a bond issuer would not exercise a call provision in an
environment of interest rates higher than those that existed at the time the bond was issued and,
conversely, that conditions of falling interest rates will increase the likelihood that a call option
will be exercised. In this case, the bond issuer would be able to exchange higher interest cost for
lower interest cost. The slope variable is determined exogenously to this model by using linear
regression on the yield on treasury securities against their respective terms to maturity on the
issue date of the bond issue. The slope coefficient of this regression model is used as a proxy for
call likelihood. A steeper slope should result in a lower risk of the bond being called, and
consequently a lower required yield, and vice-versa.
If the issue is callable prior to maturity, a binary indicator variable (Callable) is given a
value of 1; otherwise, it is set to zero. The interaction of the call variable and the yield slope
variable is important for this study, because the ability to call an issue early represents an option
to the issuing firm that has a positive value which will accrue from the purchaser of the bond. In
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addition, the ability to call the issue early raises the possibility that under conditions of falling
market rates, the very condition under which the holder of the bond will want to keep it, the bond
issue may be prematurely recalled, forcing the holder to reinvest at a lower rate (reinvestment
rate risk). These arguments suggest that the relationship between the call indicator variable and a
bond’s excess yield should be positive. The greater the likelihood that the bond will be called,
the higher the return required by the investor interested in buying the issue. At the same time,
the length of time that an issue is protected from being called should mitigate this impact. The
model includes the length of time that an issue is call-protected (in years) by subtracting the issue
year from the year that the issue is first callable (CallProt). The sign of this variable in the
model should be negative; that is to say that the longer the issue is call-protected, the lower the
required offering yield, other things equal.
Term is the number of years to maturity of the issue. This variable is included as a proxy
for interest rate risk. Interest rate theory suggests that interest rate risk rises as term to maturity
increases. Therefore, we expect that longer-term issues will have a higher required yield than
shorter-term issues in order to compensate for the additional interest rate risk. We test the model
with both the nominal value in years for the term variable and the natural log of the term
variable.
Size is the proceeds of the issue in dollars. We include this variable as a proxy for the
liquidity risk of the issue. Fisher (1959) suggests that the amount of debt issued will have an
impact on the liquidity risk of the issue. This impact can be either positive or negative. Larger
issues may be traded more frequently, thus reducing the liquidity risk of the issue; or a large
issue may have a negative price impact, increasing liquidity risk. We test the model with both
nominal value in millions and the natural log of the size variable.
We use the issue’s Standard and Poor’s rating as a proxy for default risk. While each
issue in the sample has a rating from both Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s, previous work by
Jones (1998) suggests that the market places greater weight on Standard and Poor’s rating;
therefore, we use the S&P rating to categorize issues with respect to default risk. We place the
issues into one of four default risk groups: Very High Grade (AAA), High Grade (AA to A),
Medium Grade (BBB), and Speculative (BB+ and lower). We assign three indicator variables
a value of 1 or 0, depending upon the category in which the issue’s S & P rating falls. The
Speculative grade issues will have a value of 0 for all three, Medium grade would be coded as
0,0,1; High grade as 0,1,1; and very high grade as 1,1,1. We use indicator variables rather than a
continuous variable because the ratings represent categories of risk rather than a continuous risk
measurement. In other words, AA is not more risky than AAA by some fixed amount; rather,
AA (or any rating class, for that matter) represents a broad category of issues which are similar,
but not identical.
Split is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if Moody’s rates the issue differently than
Standard and Poor’s or 0 if the two ratings are the same. Billingsley et. al. (1985) examined 258
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bonds issued between January 1977 and June 1983, 12.9% of which were split rated. Their study
found that investors perceive split-rated issues as more risky than non-split-rated issues. We
therefore expect that split-rated issues will have a higher yield than non-split-rated issues [See
also Ederington (1986), Liu and Moore (1987), and Jones (1998)].
Conv is an indicator variable that will have a value of one if the issue is convertible prior
to maturity at the option of the holder and zero otherwise. The option to convert the bond into
shares of stock acts fundamentally the same as a call option on the issuer’s stock at a strike price
equal to the conversion price of the bond. Jones (2001) examined whether or not the bond
purchaser places a value on the conversion option. Theory suggests that the added option value
of the conversion privilege would increase the price an investor would be willing to pay for a
particular issue, which, in turn, would have the effect of lowering the required yield. Jones’
(2001) work supported this theoretical relationship, finding that in his sample the average excess
yield for convertible bonds was lower than the average excess yield for non-convertible bonds.
DATA
The dataset for this study consists of 5,337 new corporate debt issues made between 1983
and 1993. (This dataset was created originally by T. Opler from data acquired from the Federal
Reserve Board of Governors Capital Markets Division. The data were acquired by the author
from the Fisher College of Business datafinder website in 1996, and additional data points have
been added since that time. The dataset has subsequently been removed from that site.) We
derived information on the slope of the yield curve from data downloaded from the Federal
Reserve
Board’s
H15
interest
rate
series,
which
can
be
found
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/update/. A general description of the data is shown
in Tables 1 and 2 below. Thirty-four percent of the issues were callable, 7.8 percent were
convertible, and 21.9 percent were split rated. All risk classifications were well represented.
The average dollar value of the issues in the sample was $139.75 million, and the issues ranged
in size from $100,000 to $2.26 billion. The average issue had a yield of 9.62 percent, and they
yielded on average 369.37 basis points above the rate on contemporaneous 3-month Treasury
bills. The callable issues were on average protected from being called for a period of 1.35 years,
with a range of immediately callable to call-protected for 20 years.
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Table 1.
Frequencies of Categorical Variables
N=5337
Variable
Number %
Callable
1816
34.0%
Convertible
415
7.8%
Split
1169
21.9%
Very High Grade 269
5.04%
High Grade
2769
51.88%
Medium Grade
1126
21.10%
Speculative Grade 1173
21.98%

Table 2.
Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables
N=5337
Minimum Maximum
Mean
Std. Deviation
SIZE (million of $)
.1000
2260.0000 139.748698 122.0392763
Term (years)
1.0000
99.0000
14.882518
10.0015304
YLD (%)
3.4500
19.8900
9.621316
2.3004184
XYTB03 (%)
.0000
14.2700
3.693705
1.9016415
CallProt
.0000
20.0000
1.350009
2.5649064
Oty (basis points)
.00
1427.00
369.3705
190.16415
Slope
-.00962
.15260
.0774309
.03842598

RESULTS
The offering yields on each of the 5,337 issues were regressed on the explanatory
variables noted in the Model Description section above using the SPSS statistical analysis
package. Based on the discussion above, the expected sign of each of the explanatory variables
is presented in Table 3 below.
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Table 3.
Expected Sign of the Coefficient of Each Explanatory Variable
Variable

Effect on Yield

Callable (b)

+

Size (c)

-

Term (c)

+

Convertible (b)

-

Split Rated (b)

+

Call Protection (c)

-

Credit Quality (b)

-

Yield Curve Slope (c)

-

The results of the regression are provided in table 4 below.
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Table 4.
Results of Linear Regression of the Model
YLD      i CVi  Slope
Variable
(Constant)
Callable
CONV
CP
Split
Vhigh
High
Med
Slope
SIZE
Term

Expected
Sign

+
+
+

Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std.
B
Error
12.871
.092
1.032
.078
-4.172
.096
-.043
.013
.318
.056
-.024
.108
-.618
.060
-2.377
.075
-14.870
.627
-.001
.000
.011
.003

Standardized
Coefficients

t

Sig.

Beta

B

Std. Error

140.152
13.195
-43.410
-3.238
5.653
-.218
-10.340
-31.665
-23.712
-3.355
4.330
Adjusted R
Square
.464

.000
.000
.000
.001
.000
.827
.000
.000
.000
.001
.000
Std. Error of
the Estimate
1.68379

.212
-.486
-.048
.057
-.002
-.133
-.428
-.248
-.034
.047

R

R Square

.682(a)

.465

Note that the signs for all explanatory variables are as expected, and that the model has
an adjusted R2 of 0.465. The only variable that does not present as statistically significant is the
indicator variable for very-high-grade debt. Recall from the model discussion above that the
credit quality indicators are additive in nature; an additional indicator is affixed above the
baseline of speculative grade, and this indicates the average additional reduction in required yield
attendant with the increase in credit quality. On average, Medium-grade issues have a required
yield 238 basis points lower than Speculative-grade; High-grade issues have a required yield 62
basis points lower than Medium-grade issues, and Very-High grade issues have a required yield
only 2 basis points lower than High-grade issues. The model does not provide evidence to
support the notion that the two-basis-point difference is statistically different from zero. This
result is consistent with the result found in Jones (2000). Perhaps the market is either unable or
unwilling to differentiate between high-grade debt and very-high-grade debt. The remaining
explanatory variables are all significant with the expected sign and will therefore not be further
discussed here.
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CONCLUSIONS
The explanatory variable of particular interest in this study is the slope coefficient of the
Treasury yield curve on the issue date for each bond issue. The interpretation of the results
relative to the coefficient of the slope variable depends upon a number of assumptions discussed
or alluded to above, and restated here.
1. The slope of the Treasury yield curve is a proxy for the market’s expectation of the future
direction of interest rates. For example, a positive slope suggests that the market expects
future interest rates will be higher than current interest rates.
2. Because bond issuers would be foolish to call an existing bond issue and replace it with a
higher-interest-rate issue, bonds are only likely to be called when interest rates are lower
than when the issue was originally floated.
3. The slope of the yield curve serves as a proxy for the likelihood that a bond will be
called. The greater the likelihood (i.e., the more negative the slope), the greater the
required premium and the lower the likelihood (i.e., the more positive the slope), the
lower the required premium.
The results support the assertion that the likelihood of a bond call can impact a bond’s
required yield at the time of issue, and consequently, its issue price. The results indicate that a
one-percent increase in the slope of the yield curve results in a decrease in the bond’s offering
yield of approximately 14.9 percent. This number seems staggering until we look at the average
slope over the 30-year yield curve. The average slope was only 0.08 percent, and the maximum
estimated slope was only 0.15 percent. At the maximum, the slope of 0.15 percent would result
in a 2.2 percent reduction in the bond’s offering yield, and the average slope of 0.08 percent
would result in a 1.2 percent offering yield reduction.
Simply put, the results of this model seem to suggest that the slope of the yield curve can
serve as a proxy for the call risk on a callable bond. Bond issuers should perhaps pay attention to
movements in the yield curve when determining when to float an issue. Issuing callable debt in
an environment of low-to-negative-sloping yield curves may save the issuer something in
offering yield.
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